Abstract. In this paper we use probabilistic arguments (Tug-of-War games) to obtain existence of viscosity solutions to a parabolic problem of the form
Introduction
Our goal in this article is to look for parabolic PDEs that may arise as continuous values of Tug-of-War games when one takes into account the number of plays that the players play and considering sets of possible movements that may depend on space and time. In this way we obtain what we can call a natural way of defining a parabolic problem involving the infinity Laplacian with spatial and time dependence.
Solutions to the infinity Laplacian D 2 u(x, t) Du |Du| (x, t), Du |Du| (x, t) = 0 appear naturally when one considers absolutely minimizing Lipschitz extensions (AMLE) of a Lipschitz function F defined on the boundary; see the survey [3] and [10] (see also [2, 7, 12, 13, 14] ). This equation (and also the p−Laplacian) was related to continuous values of Tug-of-War games, see [22] . See also [2, 4, 6, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23] and, for numerical approximations, [20] .
The evolution problem given by the infinity Laplacian, is given by (1.1) v t (x, t) = D 2 v(x, t) Dv |Dv| (x, t), Dv |Dv| (x, t) .
For existence, asymptotic behaviour and further properties of the solutions we refer to [1, 11] . Recently, see [19] , probabilistic methods (based on Tug-of-War games) where used to obtain mean value characterizations of solutions to parabolic PDEs, including the equation (1.1). The Tug-of-War game related to this equation, see [19] , can be briefly described as follows: a Tug-of-War game is a two-person, zero-sum game, that is, two players are in contest and the total earnings of one are the losses of the other. Let T be a positive constant and Ω be a bounded smooth open subset of R N . We consider the parabolic cylinder Ω T = Ω × (0, T ] with the parabolic boundary Γ = ∂Ω × [0, T ] ∪ Ω × {0} and, for a fixed η > 0 we define a strip around the parabolic boundary Γ η = Ω η × (−η 2 , 0] ∪ Θ η × (0, T ], where Ω η = x ∈ R N : dist(x, Ω) ≤ η and Θ η = {x ∈ R N \ Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ η}. Let F : Γ η → R be a Lipschitz continuous function (the final payoff function). The rules of the game are the following: At the initial time, t 0 , a token is placed at a point x 0 ∈ Ω. Then, a (fair) coin is tossed and the winner of the toss is allowed to move the game position to any x 1 ∈ B ǫ (x 0 ) and the time is decreased by cǫ 2 (c is just a normalizing constant, see [19] ). At each turn, the coin is tossed again, and the winner chooses a new game state x k ∈ B ǫ (x k−1 ) while time decreases at each time cǫ 2 . Once the token has reached some (x τ , τ ) ∈ Γ η , the game ends and the first player earns F (x τ , τ ) (while the second player earns −F (x τ , τ )). This game has a expected value u ǫ (x 0 ) (called the value of the game) that verifies the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP),
for every (x, t) ∈ Ω × (0, T ). In the above equation, it is understood that u ǫ (x, t) = F (x, t) for (x, t) ∈ Γ η . This formula can be intuitively explained from the fact that the first player tries to maximize the expected outcome (and has probability 1/2 of selecting the next state of the game) while the second tries to minimize the expected outcome (and also has probability 1/2 of choosing the next position). As ǫ → 0 we have that u ǫ ⇒ v uniformly and this limit v (that is called the continuous value of the game) turns out to be a viscosity solution to (1.1) with the Dirichlet boundary condition v(x, t) = F (x, t), for (x, t) ∈ Γ. The fact that the limit is a solution to the equation can be intuitively explained as follows: for a smooth function φ with non-zero gradient the maximum in B ǫ (x) is attained at a point on the boundary of the ball ∂B ǫ (x) that lies close to the direction of the gradient, that is, the location of the maximum is close to x + ǫDφ(x)/|Dφ(x)|. Analogously the minimum is close to x − ǫDφ(x)/|Dφ(x)| and hence the DPP, equation (1.2) , for the smooth function φ reads as
that is a discretization of the equation. Note that the right hand side is a discretization of the second derivative in the direction of the gradient. This formal calculation can be fully justified when one works in the viscosity sense, see [19] .
As we have mentioned, our goal in this paper is to show that one can obtain existence of viscosity solutions to more general parabolic equations when one allows the possible movements of the players. To be more precise, our main concern in this paper is to answer the following question:
What are the PDEs that can be obtained as continuous values of Tug-of-War games when we replace the ball B ǫ (x) with a more general family of sets A ǫ (x, t) ?
To answer this question we have to assume certain conditions on the family of sets A ǫ (x, t) and the way that they behave as ǫ → 0 (see Section 2 for details). If we play the same game described before with the possible positions given by the sets A ǫ (x, t) the DPP reads as
Following our previous discussion for the case of balls we can guess that the limit PDE as ǫ → 0 will depend on the point at which a smooth function φ with non-zero gradient attains its maximum (and its minimum) in A ǫ (x, t). Our conditions on the sets A ǫ (x, t) are such that there is a preferred direction where the maxima and the minima of a smooth function φ with non-zero gradient are closely located when ǫ → 0. This preferred direction depends on the spatial location and on the gradient of φ at that point. We call such direction J (x,t) (Dφ(x, t)). Also, due to scaling properties of the sets there is a preferred time that depends on x, t and Dφ, we call it K (x,t) (Dφ(x, t)). With this in mind our main result reads as follows:
Under adequate assumptions on the family of sets A ǫ (x, t) there is a uniform limit (along a subsequence) as ǫ → 0 of the values of the game, v, that is a viscosity solution to
, with boundary condition u(x, t) = F (x) on the parabolic boundary Γ. Uniqueness for this general problem and regularity issues seem delicate and are left open.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we describe with some details the Tug-of-War game, introduce the precise set conditions that we assume on the family of the set A ε (x, t), state the DPP for our game and prove that the game has a value and the comparison principle for values of the game; in Section 3 we prove that the ε−value of the game converge uniformly to a continuous function; finally, in Section 4 we show that the limit is a viscosity solution to our parabolic equation.
Throughout this paper, the points in R N are denoted by x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ), | · | denote the 2−norm in R N , ·, · denote the usual inner product of R N , the ball of center x 0 ∈ R N and radius ρ > 0 is denoted by B(x 0 , ρ) and π 1 , π 2 : R N +1 → R denote the projections with respect to the x−axis and t−axis respectively. Finally, let S N denote the space of symmetric N × N matrices.
Description of the game
Now, we describe the Tug-of-War game, following [17, 19] . Let F : Γ η → R be a bounded Borel function, F is called the final payoff function. Tug-of-War game with spatial and time dependence. A Tug-of-War game is a zero-sum game between two players (Player I and Player II). At the beginning a token is placed at a point (x 0 , t 0 ) ∈ Ω T and we fix ε > 0. Then, the players toss a fair coin and the winer decides a new game state (x 1 , t 1 ) in a set A ε (x 0 , t 0 ), that depends on the position (x 0 , t 0 ) and will be defined later. Then, the coin is tossed again and the winer chooses a new game state (x 2 , t 2 ) ∈ A ε (x 1 , t 1 ). They continue playing the game until the token hits the parabolic boundary strip Γ ε . At the end of the game, Player II pays Player I the amount given by the payoff function F , that is, Player I earns F (x τ , t τ ) and the Player II earns −F (x τ , t τ ), where τ is the number of rounds (a stopping time) that takes the game to end. Later, we will show that 0 < τ < +∞ (see Remark 2.2). This procedure yields a sequence of game states (x 0 , t 0 ), (x 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (x τ , t τ ), where every (x k , t k ) except (x 0 , t 0 ) are random variables, depending on the coin tosses and the strategies adopted by the players. A strategy S I for Player I is a collection of measurable mappings
such that the next game position is
if Player I wins the coin toss given the partial history ((x 0 , t 0 ), (x 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (x τ , t τ )). Similarly, Player II plays according to the strategy S II . The next game position (x k+1 , t k+1 ) ∈ A ε (x k , t k ), given the history ((x 0 , t 0 ), (x 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (x k , t k )), is selected according to a probability distribution p(·|(x 0 , t 0 ), (x 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (x k , t k )) which, in our case, is given by the fair coin toss.
The fixed starting point (x 0 , t 0 ), the domain Ω T and the strategies S I and S II determine a unique probability measure P x0 SI ,SII on the space of plays (Ω T ∪ Γ ε ) ∞ .
We denote by E (x0,t0) SI ,SII the corresponding expectation. If S I and S II denote the strategies adopted by the Player I and II respectively, given (x 0 , t 0 ) ∈ Ω T , the expected payoff is given by E (x0,t0)
The ε−value for the Player I, when starting from (x 0 , t 0 ), is then defined as
while the ε−value of the game for the Player II is given by
Now, we will describe the family of subsets of Ω T ∪ Γ ε that encode the possible movements of the game.
We consider a family of sets {A(x, t)} (x,t)∈ΩT with the following properties: For
is symmetric with respect to the origin; A3. Continuity respect to (x, t) :
From now on, J (x,t) (v) and I (x,t) (v) denote the point z and the time r respectively. Observe that v, J (x,t) (v) = 0, and
In addition, we require that,
is surjective.
Example 2.1. We now give some examples of possible choices of sets A(x, t).
(1) For any (x, t) ∈ Ω T , we define
where 0 < ρ < min{1, c /2}. For this family of sets,
for all (x, t) ∈ Ω T and v ∈ R N \ {0}.
(2) For any (x, t) ∈ Ω T , we define
where 0 < ρ < 1. Then
Then, we define the set of possible movements for any (x, t) ∈ Ω T . Given (x, t) ∈ Ω T and ε > 0 small, the set of possible movements in (x, t) is given by a scaled version of the original family of sets. We let
In the rest of this section, we only assume that the family {A(x, t)} (x,t)∈ΩT has property A1, the rest of properties will be used in the following sections.
Remark 2.2. Since, by assumption A1 the time t k decreases at least cε 2 at each round of the game, given (x, t) ∈ Ω T we have that 0 ≤ τ (x, t) < t cε 2 + 1. Then, the number of rounds that the player need to end the game when starting from (x 0 , t 0 ) is finite.
We have a Dynamic Programming Principle for our game. For the proof see [16, Chapter 3] . 
The ε−value function for the Player II, u ε II (x, t), satisfies the same equations. Our next goal is to state a comparison principle for the ε−values functions and then we will show that the game has a value.
Respectively, the supersolutions are defined by reversing the inequality for v, that is Observe that, using Theorems 2.5 and 2.6, we have that there exists a unique function that verify the DPP with a fixed boundary datum. Theorem 2.7. Let Ω ⊂ R N be a bounded smooth open set and F a given payoff function in Γ η . There exists a unique function u ε in Ω T that verify the DPP with boundary values F. Moreover, the function u ε coincides with the ε−value of the game.
Theorems 2.5 and 2.7 imply the comparison principle for functions that verify the DPP. As a consequence, we get that solutions to the DPP are uniformly bounded for bounded ε. 
Uniform convergence
In this section, we prove that, extracting a subsequence if necessary, we have uniform convergence of u ε as ε → 0. To this end, we adapt some ideas from [8] and we use the following modification of Arzela-Ascoli lemma, see [18] for the proof.
Lemma 3.1. Let {f ε : Ω T → R, ε > 0} be a set of functions such that:
(1) There exist a positive constant C so that |f ε (x, t)| < C for every ε > 0 and every (x, t) ∈ Ω T ; (2) Given ν > 0, there exist positive constants r 0 and ε 0 such that for any ε < ε 0 and any (x, t), (y, s) ∈ Ω T with |x − y| + |t − s| < r 0 , it holds that |f ε (x, t) − f ε (y, s)| < ν. Then there exists a uniformly continuous function f : Ω T → R and a subsequence still denoted by {f ε } ε>0 such that
Now, let η > 0 and F : Γ η → R be a bounded Borel function, we consider the family of functions {u ε } ε>0 where u ε are the ε−values of the game with payoff function F for each ε > 0. Observe that, by Corollary 2.9, we have that
Therefore, the family {u ε } ε>0 satisfies the first condition in Lemma 3.1. Then, to prove the uniform convergence of the family, we only need to show that {u ε } ε>0 satisfies also the second condition of the lemma. To prove this, we need to use properties A1-A2 for the family of sets {A(x, t)} (x,t)∈ΩT . Let Ω be bounded convex domain with ∂Ω ∈ C 2 and positive curvature, f : Ω η → R be a Lipschitz continuous function and assume that the family of sets {A(x, t)} (x,t)∈ΩT satisfies the properties A1-A2. Then, if we take F (x, t) = f (x) as our payoff function, given ν > 0 there exist positive constants r 0 and ε 0 such that for any ε < ε 0 and any (x, t), (y, s) ∈ Ω T with |x − y| + |t − s| < r 0 , it holds that |u ε (x, t) − u ε (y, s)| < ν, where u ε is the ε−value of the game with boundary value F (x, t), i.e. {u ε } ε>0 satisfies the second condition of the Lemma 3.1.
Proof. We divide the proof in four cases.
Case 1. The case (x, t), (y, s) ∈ Γ is a consequence of the fact that f is assumed to be Lipschitz.
Case 2. Now, we study the case (x, t) ∈ Ω T and (y, t) ∈ Γ ε with y ∈ Θ ε . As in the proof of [8, Lemma 14] , using that ∂Ω ∈ C 2 , we can choose an hyperplane Π 0 such that Π 0 is tangent to Ω at some point y 0 ∈ ∂Ω and y lies in the outward normal direction to ∂Ω at y 0 . Via a translation and rotation of the coordinate axes, we can assume that y 0 = 0 and Π 0 = {x N = 0}. Moreover, using that ∂Ω has positive curvature, there exist a positive constants k and K such that for
On the other hand, by the definition of Θ ε , if x ∈ Θ ε ∩ U there exists z ∈ ∂Ω ∩ U such that |x − z| ≤ ε. Then, for any δ > 0 if −8δ < z N < 8δ and 0 < ε <
we have that
Then, for any 0 < δ < 1 2K and 0 < ε <
where
Now, we consider the function v :
where a, b are given by
Observe that v is decreasing with respect to the space variable x N , v(x, t) ≡ β on {x ∈ R N : x N = −4δ}, v(x, t) ≡ α on {x ∈ R N : x N = ε} and, by Remark 3.2, v is a solution of the DPP. If, a = 0 then we have α = β then, by Corollary 2.9,
Now, we consider the case a = 0. We observe that, if we take
we have that v and u ε are solution of DPP in Ω ′ T = Ω × (0, T ] with payoff functions v and u ε in Γ ′ ε respectively. Since, by definition of v, u ε (x, t) ≤ v(x, t) in Γ ′ ε , using Theorem 2.8, we have that
On the other hand, there exists ε 1 > 0 (depending of δ, α and β) such that
, T ] for all ε < ε 1 . Then, by an iterative process, we have that for any m ∈ N there exists ε m > 0 (depending of δ, α and β) such that
, for all ε < ε m . The argument needed to obtain an analogous lower bound is similar. On the other hand, since f is Lipschitz, we have
∀y ∈ B(0, δ).
Therefore, given ν > 0 we can choose small δ, ε > 0 and large enough m ∈ N such that x ∈ Ω and y ∈ Θ ε with |x − y| < δ/4 m it holds
Case 3. The case (x, t) ∈ Ω T and (y, s) ∈ Ω × (−ε 2 , 0]. First, we assume that x = y and Player I follows a strategy S x I where he points to y and Player II follows any strategy. Then
is a supermartingale. Indeed,
Then, by the optimal stopping theorem and Remark 2.2, we have
where C is a constant independent of x and ε. Thus, by Jensen's inequality, we get
Hence,
where L is the Lipschitz constant of f. Then,
Similarly, choosing for Player II the strategy where he points to x, we have that
We can conclude that
Finally, if x = y, we utilize the above inequality and we have that
Therefore, by (3.5) and the above inequality, given ν > 0, there exist ε 0 , r 0 > 0 so that
for all ε < ε 0 and for any (x, t) ∈ Ω T and (y, s) ∈ Γ ε such that |x − y| + |t − s| < r 0 . Case 4. Finally, we study the case (x, t), (y, s) ∈ Ω T . We consider, as in the proof of [19, Lemma 17] ,
and the boundary stripΓ
Let (x, t), (y, s) ∈ Ω T such that |x − y| + |t − s| < r0 3 . First, if (x, t), (y, s) ∈Γ, by comparison the values (x, t) and (y, s) to the nearby boundary values and using (3.6), we have |u ε (x, t) − u ε (y, s)| ≤ ν for all ε < ε 0 .
Finally, the case (x, t), (y, s) ∈Ω T . Without loss of generality, we can assume that t > s. Definê
Then, by the reasoning above,
Letû ε be a solution of DPP inΩ T with the boundary valuesF inΓ. By comparison principle and uniqueness, we have
The reverse bound follows by a similar argument. Now, by (3.4) and using Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.3, we get the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.4. Under the same hypothesis in Lemma 3.3. Let {u ε } ε>0 be the family of solution of DPP in Ω T with a fixed Lipschitz continuous datum F (x, t) = f (x) in Γ. Then, there exists a subsequence still denoted by {u ε } ε>0 and a uniformly continuous function u such that u ε → u uniformly in Ω T as ε → 0 + .
The limit equation
Throughout this section, Ω is bounded convex domain with ∂Ω ∈ C 2 and positive curvature, f : Ω η → R is a Lipschitz continuous function and we take F (x, t) = f (x) as our payoff function. We assume that the family of sets {A(x, t)} (x,t)∈ΩT satisfies the full set of properties A1-A4.
The aim of this section is to prove that the function u, given by Theorem 3.4, is a viscosity solution of the following PDE
where D 2 u is the Hessian matrix of u and G :
where J (x,t) , I (x,t) are defined in Section 2 andÎ (x,t) (s) is defined as the unique time such that (0,Î (x,t) (s)) ∈ A(x, t),
First, we will give the precise definition of viscosity solution to (4.7) following [9] . We denote by G * and G * the upper and lower semicontinuous envelopes of G respectively, i.e.
is a viscosity solution to (4.7) if u(x, t) = F (x, t) on Γ and the following two conditions hold:
(ii) For every φ ∈ C 2,1 (Ω T ) such that u − φ has a strict maximum at (x 0 , t 0 ) ∈ Ω T we have
Now we characterize the upper and lower envelopes for the function G. Proof. We only prove the characterization for G * , the proof for G * is similar. Step 1. First we prove, G * (M, v, s, x, t) = G(M, v, s, x, t)
if v = 0. Let (M n , v n , s n , x n , t n ) → (M, v, s, x, t). As v = 0, and we can assume that v n = 0. Then, by definition, for any n ∈ N, G(M n , v n , s n , x n , t n ) = − 1 − c c I (xn,tn) (v n ) + c + 1 2 s n − 1 2 M n J (xn,tn) (v n ), J (xn,tn) (v n ) .
Since (J (xn,tn) (v n ), I (xn,tn) (v n )) ∈ A(x n , t n ) ⊂ B(0, 1) × [− c /2, c /2] for every n ∈ N, there exists a subsequence still denote by {(J (xn,tn) (v n ), I (xn,tn) (v n ))} n∈N and (y, r) ∈ B(0, 1) × [− c /2, − c /2] such that (J (xn,tn) (v n ), I (xn,tn) (v n )) → (y, r) as n → +∞.
Moreover, by A3, (y, r) ∈ A(x, t). Then, by definition of (J (x,t) (v), I (x,t) (v)), we have that On the other hand, by A3, there exist (y n , r n ) ∈ A(x n , t n ) such that (y n , r n ) → (J (x,t) (v), I (x,t) (v)) as n → +∞.
Thus, by definition of (J (xn,tn) (v n ), I (xn,tn) (v n )), we have v n , y n ≥ v n , J (xn,tn) (v n ) ∀n ∈ N.
Then, taking limit as n → +∞ and using (4.8), we get v, y = v, J (x,t) (v) .
Thus, by A4, y = J (x,t) (v) and r = I (x,t) (s), then we have G(M n , v n , s n , x n , t n ) → G(M, v, s, x, t)
as n → +∞ and therefore G * (M, v, s, x, t) = G(M, v, s, x, t)
if v = 0.
Step 2. Now, we consider the case v = 0 and we show that Let (M n , v n , s n , x n , t n ) → (M, 0, s, x, t). If v n = 0 for n large, G(M n , v n , s n , x n , t n ) = − 1 − c cÎ (xn,tn) (s n ) + c + 1 2 s n Then, as in step 1, extracting a subsequence still denoted {(M n , v n , s n , x n , t n )} n∈N , we have that (0,Î (xn,tn) (s n )) → (0, r 0 ) ∈ A(x, t), and therefore (4.9) G(M n , v n , s n , x n , t n ) → − 1 − c c r 0 + c + 1 2 s
